Abstract. PANAMA is a cryptographic module that was presented at the FSE Workshop in '98 by Joan Daemen and Craig Clapp. It can serve both as a stream cipher and as a cryptographic hash function, with a hash result of 256 bits. PANAMA achieves high performance (for large amounts of data) because of its inherent parallelism. We will analyse the security of PANAMA when used as a hash function, and demonstrate an attack able to find collisions much faster than by birthday attack. The computational complexity of our current attack is 2 82 ; the required amount of memory is negligible.
Introduction
PANAMA is a cryptographic module that can be used in two modes, called push and pull mode. The module can be used both as a hash function and as a stream cipher. For a full description of PANAMA, we refer to [1] .
In this paper we will describe a method to produce collisions for the PANAMA hash function. A collision occurs when two different messages are hashed to the same value. The PANAMA hash function maps messages of arbitrary length to a hash result of 256 bits, which means that a general birthday attack would need about 2 128 operations fo find a colliding pair of messages. We will show that with our method a collision can be found with significantly less operations and a small amount of memory.
Short Description of PANAMA
The PANAMA stream/hash module has two types of internal memory: the buffer and the state. The buffer is a linear feedback shift register, containing 32 cells of 256 bits, denoted b 0 , . . . b 31 . The state consists of 544 bits, divided in 17 32-bit words. Let the state of PANAMA be denoted by a 3-tuple (r, s, t), where r denotes the first 32-bit word of the state, and s and t each denote a 256-bit (8 words) value.
In the PANAMA hash mode, the input is padded to a multiple of 256 bits, and divided into blocks of 256 bits. All internal memory bits are set to zero, and then the following steps are executed for each message block. First, the state is updated by applying the nonlinear transformation ρ (which is composed of three specific transformations θ • π • γ, described in the next section):
(r, s, t) ← ρ(r, s, t).
Secondly, the message block m and b 16 , the contents of buffer cell 16, are exored into the state. The least significant bit of word 0 is flipped. These three operations are denoted here 1 by σ: Thirdly, the message block is fed into the buffer and the LFSR is stepped once. When all message blocks have been processed, 33 extra iterations are performed, but now the message input to the buffer is replaced by the state (part s), and the message input of σ is replaced by the contents of buffer cell 4. The 256-bit hash result is defined as the final state (part t).
Note that the buffer content is not present in the output. This means that there are two types of collisions for PANAMA: collisions in the state only, and collisions in both the buffer and the state. The 33 iterations after the last message block has been processed have as function to make it difficult to produce collisions of the first kind. We will try to find collisions of the second kind.
We will use the following notation: A message stream is denoted by P n, P (n− 1), . . . , P 2, P 1, P 0, where P 0 is the first message block and P n the last. Let X be an array of 8 32-bit words X i , then Y = r(X) ⇔ Y i = X i+2 mod 8 . Throughout this paper, '+' denotes bitwise addition (exor), except when used in the indices, where it denotes addition modulo 17 (if not explicitly stated otherwise).
Components of PANAMA
We describe here the different components of the nonlinear state updating transformation ρ. We also make some preliminary observations which will be useful later on. The transformations operate on the 17 words of the PANAMA state, where each word consists of 32 bits. In the following the index i (0 ≤ i < 17) denotes the position of the word in the state.
The Transformation θ
The linear transformation θ is defined as follows:
We calculated the inverse transformation θ −1 :
The Transformation π
The transformation π which combines cyclic word shifts with a permutation of the word positions is defined below. Here [j] (0 ≤ j < 32) denotes the bit position in a word, the multiplication 7i in the index is modulo 17 like the additions, and r(i) = i × (i + 1)/2 is a bit rotation which should be taken modulo 32.
The Transformation γ
The transformation γ is the only nonlinear component. Because γ does not mix bits with different posititions in the words, it can be considered as a parallel application of 32 transformations γ b . Let a and a + d denote two 17-bit vectors (containing one bit from each of the state words), that are input to γ b . Let c and c + e denote the corresponding outputs:
From the definition of γ, we have the following:
Using De Morgan's law, (4) can be transformed into
Doing the same with (5) and combining the result with (6), we get 
Message Format for Collisions
The linear updating function of the buffer imposes strict conditions on the format of colliding messages.
Collisions for the Buffer
The buffer has a linear updating function λ that is slightly more complex than in an ordinary LFSR, b ← λ(b) is defined by: 
where m is the message block that is fed into the buffer. Therefore, the simplest collision for the buffer has the following difference pattern in the message stream (remember that the rightmost message block is the first):
dX, 24 zero cells, r(dX), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, dX .
All difference patterns for buffer collisions are composed by adding shifted versions of pattern (8).
Collisions for the State
For a difference pattern of type (8), there will be five occasions where the input difference of the state is nonzero: the first two nonzero blocks are each injected twice in the state: once when they are the current message block and once when they pass through buffer cell 16. The last nonzero block cancels out all differences in the buffer, but is injected once in the state. We are going to use a strategy of immediate compensation in the state: every time a difference is introduced in the state, we will try to let it die out as quickly as possible. A collision can then be seen as consisting of five 'sub-collisions', where a sub-collision is defined as a collision in the state only. This is also observed by the designers of PANAMA in [1] .
Since the state update function ρ is invertible, a difference dX which is introduced can only disappear under the influence of another difference dY . An intuitive choice for the colliding messages format is the following:
Since this format is the addition of two shifted copies of (8), it will produce a collision in the buffer. The strategy of immediate compensation demands that the difference introduced in the state by the 'dX' values, is compensated by the 'dY ' values. The difference propagation should be as follows:
Note that the first propagation path applies to the first and the fifth sub-collision. It turns out that due the interaction between the buffer update operation and the state update operation, there are no solutions dX, dY for (10). A proof is given in Appendix A. Therefore we will use a difference pattern of the following form: Table 2 gives a schematic overview of the difference values in the buffer and the state during the attack.
Overview of the Procedure
We will use differences where the bits of a 32-bit word are all set or all unset. This allows to denote a difference pattern in the state with 17 bits, one for each word. Furthermore, it means that the bit rotation in π has no effect on the difference values. We make this choice mainly because it is easier to think about differences of this format. A collision will be found by combining the results of the searches for the five sub-collisions. The method we present here to find a sub-collision works for any value of the state. Note that in every sub-collision, the message input of σ is 'fresh'; it can be chosen freely. Since the message words are added to state words 1 to 8, it is easy to control that part of the state. State word 0 is exored with the constant 00000001 x so we have no direct control over its value. The buffer input of σ is added to state words 9 to 16. This input is influenced by the values of messages that have been injected in the state earlier on.
It seems difficult to make use of the fact that the buffer can be controlled: changing the buffer would require a recalculation of the current state. Our method assumes that only the message input can be controlled. Because the message input of σ influences only 8 of the 17 state words, we have not enough degrees of freedom if we vary the current message block only. Therefore, we will also have to select values for the common message block before message blocks with difference dX or r(dX).
For every sub-collision, we use the following notation. The state will be denoted by the capitals A to N , the difference values by dA to dN . We consider in total 4 σ operations, σn denoting the σ operation with message block P n. Message blocks P 0 and P 2 are equal for both messages of the collision. For sub-collisions 1, 2 and 5 block P 1 has the 'dX difference', and block P 3 the 'dY ' difference. For the other two sub-collisions these differences are imposed by the contents of buffer cell 16 in σ1 and σ3. The states K to A are equal in both messages, the common block P 0 is used to bring the state to a value that allows a sub-collision to happen. It can be seen that the absolute value of the P 3 blocks has no importance, for every sub-collision the difference in state I must be canceled by the difference in P 3 (or in buffer cell 16 for σ3).
The Chosen Difference Format
We give here a difference pattern that is a solution of (11). We describe the propagation of the difference from state B to I for every sub-collision. As noted above the pattern is decribed by 17 bits, one bit for each word (0 ≤ i < 17). The difference propagation through the linear transformations π and θ does not depend on the absolute value of the state, while σ2 doesn't change the difference at all. The difference propagation through the nonlinear transformation γ depends on the absolute value of the state and this imposes a set of conditions on the absolute value of the state at 'time' B and F . These conditions, which can be derived using the results from Table 1 , must be satisfied for the sub-collisions to occur. Note again that we can work with single bits because γ can be seen as 32 parallel transformations γ b . Table 3 below shows the required difference propagation for sub-collision 1 (and 5). In this table state B has the difference dX in part s, as imposed by message block P 1. State I has the difference dY in part s, which will be canceled by message block P 3. Parts r (i = 0), s (i = 1, . . . 8) and t (i = 9, . . . 16) are clearly seperated in the table. Table 1 has been used to derive the following conditions on B and F for the difference propagation of Table 3 .
For the other sub-collisions we refer to the similar Tables 4 to 5 and conditions (35) to (40) in Appendix B. All these sub-collisions are related because in every case state B contains the difference dX or r(dX) in part s (imposed by the message) or part t (imposed by buffer cell 16), while state I must contain the difference dY respectively r(dY ) in the corresponding part of the state.
Other solutions for the difference format are possible. We have chosen one which results in the minimum number of conditions on B and F . It is not clear how to make an optimal choice for an easy solution of these conditions in the next step of the attack (section 7).
Producing Collisions
In order to generate each of the sub-collisions we need to solve the conditions for the absolute state values at 'time' B and F as given in section 6 and Appendix 
B. Values for state words 1 to 8 (part s)
can be met by a suitable choice of the message block used at the corresponding time: P 1 for B and P 2 for F . To meet the values for the other state words (0 and 9 to 16, parts r and t) we need to calculate backwards to the previous message block: P 0 for B and P 1 for F . In this way the problem of finding a sub-collision can be solved in three steps:
1. solve a system of equations in the unknowns L 1 , . . . L 8 , this determines message block P 0, 2. solve a system of equations in the unknowns B 1 , . . . B 8 , this determines message block P 1, 3. solve a system of equations in the unknowns F 1 , . . . F 8 , this determines message block P 2.
The difficulty in solving these systems of equations is that when we calculate backwards to the previous message blocks, we obtain increasingly nonlinear equations because of the transformation γ. In our approach we only go back through one application of γ. To explain how we solve the problem, we will first describe the solution of the first sub-collision in some detail. Next we will summarize the procedure for the other sub-collisions and discuss the complexity of the attack.
Producing Sub-collision 1 (and 5)
From (14) it can be seen that there are 7 conditions in the unknowns F 1 , . . . F 8 . Let [j] denote the bit position, then we have the following equations for 0 ≤ j < 32: the unknowns B 1 , . . . B 8 . These have to be added to the 3 conditions we already have in these unknowns from (13),
resulting in an overdetermined system of 9 equations (and 32 bit positions). Generally such a system of equations has no solution, unless if one of the equations is dependent on the other eight. If there is no hidden structure in these equations, we can assume that we will need 2 32 trials before we can solve this system of equations. Experimental evidence confirms this assumption.
To calculate backwards from F to B we apply the transformations σ, θ, π and γ, which lead to the following equations. 
which translates to two requirements, one for bitwise addition of all values obtained with even j, and one for bitwise addition of all values obtained with odd j. This can be seen as a requirement on 2 bits. Hence the probability that a solution for this system of equations can be found is 1/2 32+2 . We can try random values of the initial state K until this happens and at that time message blocks P 0 and P 1 are determined. We can then calculate states C, D, E and F 0 , F 9 , . . . F 16 , and choose a suitable value of message block P 2 to satisfy (15) (the conditions on F 1 , . . . F 8 ) .
The complexity to find sub-collision 1 (or 5) with this procedure is 2 34 .
Producing the Other Sub-collisions
Sub-collision 2. In this case there are 6 conditions in the unknowns F 1 , . . . F 8 , which can easily be met by choosing message block P 2. The 7 remaining conditions on F 0 , F 9 , . . . 
Complexity of the Attack
As seen above the complexities for finding the 5 sub-collisions are 2 34 , 2 82 , 2 48 , 2 80 and 2 34 respectively. There is no problem in connecting the sub-collisions, as we only need an arbitrary initial state for each, which can be obtained by choosing random message blocks between the sub-collisions. So the total complexity for our collision-finding attack is determined by sub-collision 2 (which is the most difficult to find). This complexity is about 2 82 . We tested this attack for a reduced version of PANAMA where all words have a bitlength of 8 instead of 32 (so the hash has length 64), and this confirmed the given complexities (for the 8-bit version the complexity is about 2 22 ). Subcollisions 1, 3 (and 5) were also tested for a 16-bit version which again confirmed the complexity.
We believe improvements to this attack are possible. First of all better methods to solve the systems of nonlinear equations can be looked for. Furthermore, our attack still has a lot of freedom. We can calculate further backwards which has the advantage that we get more unknowns, but the difficulty that we get more complex nonlinear equations.
Conclusion
We have presented a method for producing collisions for PANAMA. The complexity of our current attack is 2 82 . Although this is still too high to actually find collisions for PANAMA, it is much faster than a general birthday attack which would require on the order of 2 128 operations. Furthermore, we believe this attack can be improved, and because of the large degree of freedom we have, we think it is likely that with additional effort collisions can actually be found for PANAMA.
In order to improve the security of PANAMA, the design could be altered so that the message influences a smaller part of the state (e.g., exor only 4 message words into the state at every application of σ). Instead, more buffer cells could be used as input of σ. The consequence for the attacker is that he has a smaller degree of freedom, and therefore needs to go further backwards in the attack to obtain enough unknowns, which gives him more complex equations to solve. Preferrably, the different buffer cells that would be used as input of σ, should be selected in such a way that the different sub-collisions can no longer be treated independently (cf. Table 2 ). Of course this would decrease the performance of the algorithm. Furthermore, there still is a fundamental problem that we have the freedom to choose message blocks, and are able to go backwards in the attack by choosing message blocks before the sub-collision. To obtain confidence in the security of the algorithm, it seems necessary to ensure that we need to consider so many message blocks for one sub-collision so that the attacks on the different sub-collisions interfere with each other, making this strategy impossible.
Because sub-collison 2 and 4 will result in similar conditions on r(dY ), the only valid solution is dY = 0. It's a bit surprising that combining the results of sub-collision 1 and 3 alone does not suffice to reach this conclusion; we get 7 equations for each sub-collision, but they are not independent, e.g. 2 of the 7 equations from sub-collision 1 are redundant.
B Difference Propagation for Sub-collisions 2 to 4
We give here Tables 4 and 5 with the required difference propagation for subcollisions 2, 3 and 4, as well as the corresponding conditions on the absolute value of the state at 'time' B and F . Sub-collision 1 was described in section 6, where we also discussed the relations between Tables 3 to 5. The difference propagation in sub-collision 2, as specified in Table 4 , leads to the following conditions for B:
B 3 = 1, B 4 + B 5 = 1, B 6 = 0,
and the following conditions for F : The difference propagation in sub-collision 3, as specified in Table 5 ( 
and the following conditions for F :
F 0 = 1, F 1 + F 2 = 1, F 2 + F 3 = 1, F 4 = 0, F 5 + F 6 = 1, F 6 + F 7 = 1, F 7 = F 8 , F 8 = F 9 , F 9 + F 10 = 1, F 11 = 0, F 12 = 1, F 13 = F 14 = F 15 , F 16 = 0.
(38) The difference propagation in sub-collision 4, as specified in Table 5 ( 
F 0 = 1, F 4 = 0, F 6 = 1, F 7 = 0, F 8 + F 9 = 1, F 8 = F 10 , F 11 = 0, F 12 + F 13 = 1, F 12 = F 14 , F 12 = F 15 , F 12 = F 16 .
